Economic Impacts of Proposed Limits on Trans Fats in Canada by Gray, Richard S. et al.
N u m b er   7 / 2 0 0 6 / p . 1 4 9 - 1 6 1   w w w . C A F RI . o rg  
 
 







Economic Impacts of Proposed Limits  
on Trans Fats in Canada 
Richard Gray 
Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan 
Stavroula Malla 
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Lethbridge 
Ken Perlich  
Economist, ECONEX Consulting, Lethbridge 
The Issue 
In response to growing concerns about coronary heart disease (CHD), the Government of 
Canada has recently taken policy measures to reduce Canadian trans fatty acid (TFA) 
consumption. The mandatory labelling of trans fat content in foods began in December 
2005. The House of Commons also established a task force in November 2004 to develop 
a set of regulations to ban the sale of food products with a TFA content greater than 
2 percent. The issue at stake is whether the mandatory content restriction has economic 
merit. While the mandatory TFA reductions could reduce heart disease and improve the 
health of Canadians, they also have the potential to increase economic costs faced by all 
aspects of the Canadian food oil complex, from primary producers to consumers. The goal 
of this article is to examine the impacts of a mandatory reduction of trans fat content by 
estimating the potential health benefits and potential adverse impacts on the agri-food 
sector. 
Implications and Conclusions 
In this study we found a ban on industrial trans fats would create health benefits in an 
order of magnitude larger than the increase in food industry costs associated with the ban. 
Theoretically we show that as long as significant health care costs are paid for through 
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private or public health care insurance, TFA labelling alone will not provide adequate 
incentives for a reduction in TFA consumption. In our empirical analysis, we estimate that 
several billion dollars in benefits would be forgone if reduction in TFA consumption were 
encouraged through labelling alone. We find a ban of trans fats in Canadian food products 
would be very beneficial from a health and health care–cost perspective, with relatively 
small  costs  of  implementation  and  compliance.  The  present  value  of  health  care–cost 
savings of a ban to Canadians would exceed $19 billion. Oilseed growers, whose price is 
set in the global market, would be largely unaffected by a ban. Generally, the increase in 
cost will occur in the crusher and food processor sectors, through the cost of product 
reformulation and the substitution of higher cost high-oleic (HO) canola and soybean oils. 
These costs  will ultimately be passed through to consumers,  resulting in very modest 
increases in consumer expenditure. The overall result is a large net gain in welfare over a 
range of plausible scenarios. 
Other observations: 1) mandatory labelling of trans fats in Canada and the United 
States  has  already  resulted  in  the  introduction  of  many  trans  fat–free  products  in  the 
marketplace … far more than anticipated by the Food and Drug Administration (2003); 
2) an immediate ban on trans fats may lead manufacturers to substitute canola and soy oils 
with tropical oils that are high in saturated fats, limiting the benefits associated with a 
trans fat ban; 3) genetic modification of canola and soybeans to increase high-oleic fatty 
acid offers considerable promise to address the demand for more stable oils. Delay in the 
regulatory approval of these products is costing Canadians many millions of dollars per 
year in health related costs; 4) food processors are likely to experience only a modest 
increase in cost, which is expected to be passed on to consumers.  
Background  
The  evolution  of  nutritional  knowledge  regarding  fat  consumption  has  played  an 
interesting and integral role in the development of the vegetable oil industry. Before the 
introduction of vegetable oils, animal fats, made up of butter, lard and tallow, were the 
fats of choice for most of the Canadian food industry. When research in the late 1950s and 
the 1960s found a correlation between animal fat consumption and heart disease (e.g., 
Ahrens et al., 1957; Keys, Anderson and Grande, 1965; Hegsted et al., 1965), the industry 
began to shift toward vegetable oils, including tropical oils; the latter (coconut, palm, and 
palm kernel oil) are by nature high in saturated fatty acids. 
Mounting evidence that vegetable oils high in saturated fatty acids also increased the 
risk of coronary heart disease prompted food manufacturers and food service groups to 
begin evaluating alternative fats and oils (see, for example,  Malla,  Hobbs and Perger, 
2005). Vegetable oils such as canola and soybean oils, with their high levels of linoleic 
acid and low levels of saturated fatty acids, were obvious healthy alternatives; however, 
canola and soybean oils were not functional in most processed food products (see figure 
1). With the high levels of linoleic acid, neither oil was very stable when heated, and both Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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became rancid easily. They did not perform the way saturated fats did during processing, 
nor did they provide the same sensory characteristics in the final food product.  
To provide these missing functional properties, edible oil manufacturers hydrogenated 
the  canola  and  soybean  oils  (see  figure  2)  (Dow  Agroscience,  2005;  List,  2004).  By 
controlling the level of hydrogenation, manufacturers could make these vegetable oils 
suitable for a wide range of functions in the food industry. What was not widely known at  
 















Figure 1  Total Canadian vegetable oil consumption by type. 









Figure 2  Total Canadian vegetable oil consumption by level of hydrogenation. 
Source: Dow Agroscience, publication date unknown Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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Table 1  Trans Fat Consumption in Canada, 2001 





















Shortening  360,986  32.97  19.84  6.54  1.96 
Salad dressing  617,944  56.43  4.00  2.26  0.68 
Margarine  128,736  11.76  20.14  2.37  0.71 
Lard  12,980  1.19  3.50  0.04  0.01 
Total  1,120,646  102.34  9.21  11.21  3.36 
1Source of data: Statistics Canada, 2001.  
2 The per day consumption is calculated from the total consumption divided by 30 million (population) and 365 to 
get individual daily consumption. 
3 Estimates based on USDA, Nutrient Data Laboratory (1995). 
4 Individual daily TFA consumption is calculated by multiplying the individual daily fat consumption by the TFA 
content by category. 
5 We are assuming that only 30% of the total consumed oil is actual dietary intake. Much of the fat is thrown out 
after use rather than being consumed. In reconciling the difference between reported human use consumption of 
visible fats and the actual dietary intake, it is estimated that approximately 70% of these fats never reach the 
stomachs of consumers.   
Source: Malla, Hobbs and Perger (2005, p. 178) 
the time of introduction was that molecular changes occurred during the hydrogenation 
process.  These  changes  created  TFAs  (see  table  1  and  figure  3).  Recent  research  has 
demonstrated  that  these  industrially  produced  TFAs  not  only  increase  levels  of  LDL 
cholesterol in the blood, they also lower the beneficial HDL cholesterol levels, leading 
 
Figure 3  Major food sources of trans fatty acids for American adults. 
Source: FDA Consumer Magazine, 2003 Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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some researchers to conclude that, gram for gram, TFAs pose a higher risk for coronary 
heart disease than do saturated fatty acids (e.g., Ross et al., 2002; Sundram, French and 
Clandinin, 2003; Muller et al., 1998). It should be noted that TFAs are also produced 
naturally by bacteria in ruminant animals and are found in the animals’ fat. Common 
sources of natural trans fatty acids include meat from ruminant animals, milk, cheese and 
butter (FDA, 2003).  
This  new  health  information  regarding  the  deleterious  effects  of  TFA  is  already 
causing  a  shift  away  from  the  use  of  hydrogenated  oils.  Some  of  this  shift  occurred 
through a voluntary process of product modification and voluntary labelling. This effect 
has  been  accelerated  with  compulsory  food  labelling  in  North  America  and  the  EU. 
Despite  these  trends,  various  consumer  and  health  organizations  have  been  applying 
pressure on the food industry to reduce or eliminate industrially produced trans fat from 
food products.  
Conceptual Framework 
Modeling  the  effects  of  a  TFA  ban  requires  consideration  of  both  the  costs  and  the 
benefits  of  compliance.  The  analysis  is  further  complicated  by  consideration  of  the 
impacts of labelling and the prevalence of public health insurance. The market, viewed at 
the consumer level, is shown in figure 4. The supply curve SS represents the supply curve 
for a product containing TFA. The demand curve DoDo represents the demand curve of 
consumers oblivious to any adverse impacts of TFA. In this situation, the private firms 
will supply the TFA product and the quantity demanded will be equal to Qo.   
The curve MBsMBs represents the social marginal benefits; this curve is equal to the 
private  demand  curve  minus  the  health  costs.  The  vertical  distance  includes  both  the 
private and the external health costs associated with TFA product consumption. The area 
abcd represents the total health costs of consumption, and the triangle gab represents the 
dead weight loss (dwl) from socially excessive consumption. If this area of dwl exceeds 
the area of economic surplus cfg, then a trans fat ban will increase economic surplus even 
if non-TFA substitutes are not available.  
The impact of consumer information without TFA substitutes is also illustrated in 
figure 4. If consumers are perfectly informed about the health effects of TFA consumption 
and  are  aware  of  the  TFA  content  of  their  food,  and  there  are  no  non-TFA  products 
available, then the informed consumers’ demand shifts inward to DiDi. The new market 
equilibrium  quantity  shifts  to  Qi,  reducing  the  socially  excessive  consumption. 
Unfortunately, even in this case, the consumers consume more than the socially optimal 
amount due to the health care externality.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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Now consider the case where a trans fat ban is introduced and a product containing no 
TFA,  a  “non-TFA  product”,  with  exactly  the  same  functional  and  taste  properties,  is 
produced on a supply curve S'S', with the vertical difference above SS representing the 
additional marginal cost of production. Independent  of any consumer knowledge, if a 
TFA ban is introduced in the presence of the TFA substitute, the new market equilibrium 
is at point X. At this point both upstream producer surplus and market consumer surplus 
are reduced but health care costs are eliminated, generating a net economic surplus equal 
to area Xed.  
If TFA substitutes exist, the impacts of consumer information and labelling become 
considerably  more  complex.  Some  informed  consumers  could  be  willing  to  pay  a 
sufficient premium for non-TFA products that the industry would find it profitable to shift 
to these higher cost non-TFA products. Even in this case voluntary labelling would differ 
from compulsory labelling in effectiveness. With voluntary labelling, firms wishing to 
differentiate their non-TFA products would label in an attempt to capture a greater market 
share,  while  firms  with  TFA products  would have no incentive to label.  This lack of 
labelling would leave the consumers of these products ignorant of the TFA content. Thus 
 
Figure 4  The market for trans fat–containing products. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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one would expect a more widespread adoption of non-TFA products under a mandatory 
labelling scheme. Even with mandatory labelling, if either the private health costs are too 
small to warrant non-TFA production, or there are some consumers that remain ignorant, 
then a private market for some TFA products will persist and continue to generate health 
care costs.  
Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Canadian TFA Policies 
The efficacy of policies designed to limit the consumption of TFAs will ultimately be 
determined by both the costs and the benefits of each. A regulation to restrict TFA use 
would increase costs to consumers, but at the same time would reduce private and public 
health care costs. Even a labelling policy requires resources for product testing, product 
reformulation and new design.  
In this section we estimate the potential costs and benefits of three different policies: 
1) a voluntary labelling system; 2) a mandatory labelling system; and 3) a ban on foods 
with greater than 2 percent TFA. The voluntary labelling scenario provides a relevant 
counterfactual to the other policies, because this is the most plausible situation in the 
absence of mandatory labelling or a ban. The effects of mandatory labelling are included 
as a scenario because this policy was recently introduced in Canada, and the effects of a 
TFA ban must be considered within this context. Finally, we examine a TFA ban, given 
that this policy is currently under consideration in Canada. 
Data and relationships are drawn from a number of sources to estimate the costs and 
benefits for each of the three scenarios. We draw extensively on estimates published in the 
Federal Register of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in 2003. This extensive study 
was  done  as  a  requirement  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Federal  Marketing  Order 
requiring the mandatory labelling of TFA in the  United States. Both the cost and the 
benefit  estimates  were  subjected  to  public  comment  and  scrutiny  prior  to  the  final 
estimates.  The  FDA  relationships  are  applied  to  estimates  of  Canadian  consumption, 
production and health costs. 
The parameters and assumptions used to calculate the costs and benefits are shown in 
table  2.  The  best  estimates,  low  estimates  and  high  estimates  are  shown  in  separate 
columns. The best estimates are based on what we believe to be the most plausible set of 
assumptions. The low estimates are intended to provide very conservative estimates of net 
benefits, forming a lower bound for the plausible range. The high estimates are intended 
to provide an upper bound. 
In our analysis we estimate that the effects of Canadian TFA policy on Canadian 
oilseed growers would be virtually zero, and we exclude this effect. Vegetable oil prices 
are determined in global markets, and Canada is an exporting country. Given that Canada 
has less than 1 percent of the world’s population and only a small market share, changes 
in  Canadian  consumption  would  have  little  price  impact.  Furthermore,  TFA  policy  is 
likely to have very little impact on total Canadian vegetable oil consumption. Finally, any Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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small reduction in global oil demand brought about by Canadian TFA policy is likely to 
be more than offset by an increase in demand for high-oleic canola, which has already 
become a significant crop.  
With the exception of a modest price increase, we assume that a TFA ban would 
significantly restrict neither the quality of products available nor consumer choice. We 
arrived at this simplified assumption after observing the changes in products that had 
already taken place as a result of TFA labelling and discussing the issue with a number of 
industry experts.  Most of the discussion centered around the availability of laminated 
bakery  products,  which  tend  to  be  layered  with  hydrogenated  vegetable  oils.  These 
industry  experts  indicated  that  the  short-run  response  in  most  cases  would  be 
reformulations based on tropical oils and animal fats. These more traditional formulations 
had an appealing taste to consumers but were rejected historically with the belief that a 
move to hydrogenated vegetable oils was healthier; a move back to these more traditional 








Discount rate    5%  5%  5% 
% Can versus number of US products  80  80  40 
US reformulation cost ($millions) .1%   18.86  37.71  9.93 
US testing and labelling cost  245.3  490.6  245.3 
Daily % intake of energy from TFA in 2000  5.86  5.86  5.86 
% reformulation voluntary labelling adoption 2006  15  15  15 
% reformulation voluntary labelling adoption 2010  30  30  30 
% reformulation man. labelling adoption 2006  25  25  25 
% reformulation man. labelling adoption 2010  50  50  50 
% reformulation with ban 2006  30  30  30 
% reformulation with ban 2015  80  80  90 
% mono/poly adoption voluntary labelling 2006  30  30  30 
% mono/poly adoption voluntary labelling 2010  40  40  40 
% mono/poly adoption with man. labelling 2006  30  30  30 
% mono/poly adoption with man. labelling 2010  50  50  50 
% mono/poly adoption with ban 2006  30  30  30 
% mono/poly adoption with ban 2010  80  80  90 
% mono/poly sub that is non HO  20  20  20 
% change in CHD / % mono red TFA  2.87  1.44  2.87 
% change in CHD / % sat red TFA  1.84  0.92  1.84 
Annual Canadian CHD cost ($millions)  18,473  9,237  18,473 
Lag for CHD effect (years)  3  3  3 
HO production costs ($/t/seed)  $44   $44   $44  
HO production costs ($/t/oil)   $110    $220    $110  
2000 Canadian hydrogenated veg. oil disappearance   233,000  233,000  233,000 
Source: authors’ estimates and other sources (see text) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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recipes will be welcomed by the taste buds of many consumers. Furthermore, FDA (2003) 
found a wide range of TFA currently in each product category, suggesting that low-TFA 
formulations  already  exist  and  new  reduced-TFA  shortening  formulations  are 
commercially available. Lacking tangible examples of products that would cease to exist 
in the case of a mandatory limit of 2 percent TFA, we do not include the loss of consumer 
choice as a cost in our analysis.   
For  the  “best  estimates”  we  assume  that  the  Canadian  food  suppliers  will  incur 
labelling costs on 80 percent of the number of products that are affected in the United 
States. While the Canadian market is far smaller than the U.S. food market, supermarkets 
and food lines are of similar dimensions. FDA (2003) estimates that it will cost $245 
million dollars to test and relabel all affected food products with mandatory labelling. The 
FDA (2003)  reports a  cost of $18.86  million (CDN) dollars in reformulation costs to 
achieve a reduction of .1 percent in daily energy from TFA. We linearly apply this ratio of 
cost to TFA reductions achieved in each scenario. The daily intake of TFA is assumed to 
be 5.86 percent of daily energy requirements, which is the amount reported in the FDA 
(2003) study. 
Each policy scenario has a unique TFA reduction profile. For example in the best 
estimate  we  assume  that,  by  2006,  15  percent  of  products  were  reformulated  in  the 
presence of voluntary regulation, and in the presence of mandatory labelling and a trans 
fat ban these numbers would increase to 25 and 30 percent respectively. In the case of 
voluntary labelling we estimate TFA reduction would increase linearly to 30 percent by 
2010 and then level off. This is in contrast to a TFA ban, where TFA reduction would 
linearly increase to 80 percent by 2015 and then level off.  
The  initial  substitution  to  saturated  fats  with  a  greater  shift  to  mono  and 
polyunsaturates over time is also reflected in our estimates. For instance, with mandatory 
labelling, in 2006 only 30 percent of the TFA substitution will be made up of unsaturated 
fats, increasing to 50 percent by 2010.  
The reduction in TFA will also affect the use of HO canola and oil production costs.  
We assume that any substitution with unsaturated fats beyond 20 percent will be sourced 
from HO Canola. For example, with a TFA ban, by 2015 there is assumed to be an 80 
percent substitution of non-saturates for TFA. Of this amount, 60 percent will come from 
HO  Canola.  Based  on  Gray,  Mall  and  Perlich  (2005),  we  assume  that  this  HO  oil  is 
produced at a cost of $110 per tonne, which is incorporated into the reformulation costs. 
The health care–cost savings are based on the relationships reported in the FDA report 
(2003) as applied to Canadian CHD health costs (Health Canada, 1998). It is assumed that 
every  1  percent  reduction  in  daily  energy  from  TFA  that  is  replaced  by  energy  from 
saturated  fatty  acid  reduces  the  incidence  of  CHD  by  1.84  percent.  An  even  greater 
reduction  of  2.87  percent  in  CHD  is  achieved  if  the  TFA  is  replaced  with  mono  or 
polyunsaturated fatty acids. The resulting reduction in CHD is applied to the Canadian 
annual cost of $18.4 billion per year. Similar to the FDA, in each case we use a linear Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
 
 
      158 
relationship  between  TFA  consumption  and  health  outcomes,  as  we  could  not  find 
information about second-order effects. 
The assumptions for the low estimate are modified to deliberately take extreme values 
for additional costs, while at the same time deliberately reducing the benefits from TFA 
reduction. The high estimate assumes that most of the reformulation costs will be born in 
the U.S. food lines. The figures printed in bold in table 2 for these scenarios differ from 
those used in the best estimate. 
Results 
The estimated costs and benefits for each scenario are shown in table 3, based on the 
assumptions and data/relationships presented above.  The  reported  amounts are present 
value figures for the period 2006 to 2025 based on a 5 percent real discount rate.  
Scenario 1 presents the potential costs and benefits, and in turn estimates the benefit 
to  cost  (B/C)  ratio,  of  a  voluntary  labelling  system.  Specifically,  for  the  best  (most 
realistic) estimate the testing/labelling cost is $66 million while the product reformulation 
cost is $295, which together account for $361 million in expenditures. Furthermore, the 
CHD health benefit estimate is equal to $7,357 million. Hence, the B/C ratio associated 
with voluntary labelling is 20.4:1. For the low-estimate scenario (conservative estimates) 
the B/C ratio is 2.5:1, while for the high estimates (optimistic estimates) the B/C ratio is a 
very high 40.3:1.  
Scenario 2 presents the potential costs and benefits of a mandatory labelling system, 
as  well as the B/C ratio.  The testing/labelling cost, where  all products are tested  and 
labelled,  is  equal  to  $187  million.  The  mandatory  labelling  stimulates  an  increased 
product reformulation cost of $471  million. Thus, the total estimated industry cost of 
mandatory labelling is equal to $658 million. However, the CHD health benefits are equal 
to  $12.57  billion.  Consequently,  for  the  best  estimate  the  B/C  ratio  when  mandatory 
labelling is implemented is 19.1:1. This B/C ratio is reduced to 2.4:1 for the low estimate 
and increases to 47.1:1 for the high estimate. 
Finally, scenario 3 estimates the benefits and costs when a ban on foods with greater 
than 2 percent TFA is implemented. Specifically, the testing/labelling cost is equal to 
$187 million and the product reformulation cost is $754 million, accounting for a total 
industry cost of $941 million. Under this scenario the CHD health benefits increase to 
$19.54 billion, resulting in a B/C ratio of 20.8:1. For the low-estimate scenario, the B/C 
ratio is equal to 2.6:1, while for the high-estimate case it is a very large 51.5:1. 
To evaluate the net economic benefits of the mandatory labelling system, we compare 
the benefits and costs of mandatory labelling to the voluntary labelling system that most 
likely would exist in the absence of mandatory labelling (i.e., scenario 2 vs. 1). For the 
best estimates (most realistic), the additional costs the industry would incur switching 
from voluntary labelling to a mandatory labelling system amount to $297 million ($121 
million  in  testing/labelling  costs  and  $176  million  in  product  reformulation  costs). Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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Meanwhile the extra CHD health benefits of the mandatory labelling system are equal to 
$5.21 billion. Consequently, the B/C ratio or the net economic benefits of introducing a 
mandatory labelling system in Canada are equal to17.6:1. This B/C ratio is reduced to 
2.2:1 for the low estimate and increases to 61.8:1 for the high estimate. 
These results suggest mandatory TFA labelling is very advantageous for the Canadian 
economy. While this is a remarkably high B/C ratio, the FDA (2003) analysis estimated 
that mandatory labelling in the United States would have a B/C ratio of over 170:1. The 
somewhat lower B/C ratio for Canada is largely a result of similar product testing and 
labelling costs with a much smaller population base.  
Finally, comparing the effect of a TFA ban to that of a mandatory labelling system 
(i.e., scenario 3 vs. 2), the ratio of additional benefits and costs is 24.7:1. The additional 
Table 3  Benefits and Costs of Voluntary and Mandatory Labelling and TFA Ban 
Results  







1) voluntary  testing/labelling $M  66   132   66  
   product reformulation $M  295   590   117  
   total cost $M  361   723   183  
   CHD health benefits $M  7,357   1,839   7,357  
   benefit/cost  20.4   2.5   40.3  
2) mandatory  testing/labelling $M  187   374   93  
   product reformulation $M  471   943   174  
   total cost $M  658   1,316   267  
   CHD health benefits $M  12,568   3,142   12,568  
   benefit/cost  19.1   2.4   47.1  
3) TFA ban  testing/labelling $M  187   374   93  
   product reformulation $M  754   1,508   317  
   total cost $M  941   1,881   410  
   CHD health benefits $M  19,541   4,885   21,109  
   benefit/cost  20.8   2.6   51.5  
2 versus 1  testing/labelling $M  121   242   27  
   product reformulation $M  176   352   57  
   total cost $M  297   594   84  
   CHD health benefits $M  5,211   1,303   5,211  
   benefit/cost  17.6   2.2   61.8  
3 versus 2  testing/labelling $M  0   0   0  
   product reformulation $M  282   565   143  
   total cost $M  282   565   143  
   CHD health benefits $M  6,973   1,743   8,541  
   benefit/cost  24.7   3.1   59.7  
Source: authors’ calculations Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Gray, S. Malla and K. Perlich 
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CHD health benefits are $6.97 billion as compared to the additional product reformulation 
cost of $282 million. For the low-estimate scenario the B/C ratio is 3.1:1 while for the 
high  estimate-scenario  the  B/C  ratio  is  a  very  high  59.7:1.  This  suggests  substantial 
economic  gain  would  be  achieved  from  moving  beyond  labelling  to  a  regulatory 
restriction of TFA use. 
Overall Effects of TFA Reduction 
In each of the three policy scenarios examined we found a very high benefit to cost ratio.  
While voluntary labelling resulted in substantial net benefits, the extent of net benefits 
was further increased with mandatory labelling. The greatest net benefits were generated 
with  a  ban  on  food  products  with  TFA  content  above  2  percent.  These  results  are 
consistent with a conclusion that the health care costs associated with TFA consumption 
are significant and can be effectively addressed with a consumer shift toward non-TFA 
products, given appropriate policies that incorporate information and health externalities. 
The analysis reported in this article combined information from a number of sources 
to  estimate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  yet  untested  policy  that  could  have  widespread 
impacts both on the foods produced and consumed in Canada and on health care costs. 
Arriving at estimates required the use of information that was available at the time of 
study. The estimates reported in the sensitivity analysis reflect the range of uncertainty in 
this assessment. The consistently high benefit to cost ratio suggests that policies to restrict 
TFA consumption have a large potential payoff. 
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